This 
Introduction
Edward Heath's Prime Ministerial tenure (1970 to 1974) coincided with a period of profound ideological turbulence within the Conservative Party. He would have to manage the conflict between progressives in the one-nation mould who wanted to remain situated on the centre ground, and those on the right who wanted to pursue a more free market strategy. He struggled to manage this divide effectively and as a consequence his political reputation was damaged. 1 His 'concessions', and his desire to get his legislation through 'unchanged'. 9 The consequence was that Conservative backbenchers were left unable to influence policy through informal meetings with ministers (designed to secure compromises and then support), and thus if they disagreed with government policy the only 'available outlet for their frustration' was parliamentary rebellion. 10 This paper examines one of the chief means through which Prime Ministers can effectively manage their parliamentary party -i.e. through their power of ministerial appointments and dismissals. Did Heath use this power effectively or did he mismanage these powers and contribute to the escalation of internal party dissent, as implied by amongst others Norton, Crowe and Franklin et al? 11 The paper acknowledges that there is a significant academic literature on ministerial selection within British Government. 12 The focus of these studies varies but include the balances and constraints regarding Cabinet and ministerial formation 13 ; the power of Prime Ministerial dismissal 14 ; length of ministerial tenure and resignations 15 ; ministerial turnover and reshuffles 16 ; and junior ministerial office and the career trajectories of ministers. 17 However, a recurring theme within these analyses is the relative neglect of ministerial selection within the Heath government when compared to other post war governments. This paper attempts to address this gap in the literature and in doing so it aims to consider three key questions with regard to the Heath era:
1. Did Heath intensify his party management difficulties by not reshuffling his ministerial team frequently enough? This question is asked to assess the validity of the claim by Stuart Ball (writing in 1996) that Heath's 'problems were exacerbated by his refusal to use the lubrication of patronage on the expected scale' and 'the infrequency of reshuffles and promotions'. 18 
When Heath made his ministerial appointments what was the dominant consideration -
rewarding those who were loyal to him, or identifying those most talented and thus suitable to the demands of ministerial office? This question is asked to obtain a deeper insight into the claim by Norton (writing in 1978) , that Heath was driven by loyalty rather than ability. 19 3. To what extent did Heath benefit from the insights of his Chief Whip in making ministerial appointments, dismissals and promotions? Is Campbell correct when he claims that Heath 'did not listen enough to what the Chief Whip was telling him'? 20 If advice was offered, what was it, and did Heath act upon it, or dismiss it. In addressing these questions, most notably the last one, the paper will analyse a series of memorandums from Francis Pym to Heath, between early 1971 and late 1973, on government reshuffles released by the Cabinet Office (PREM 5), in order to identify and interpret the guidance that was offered by Pym. The emphasis on the importance of the Chief Whip's advice is justified on the following grounds. It is the Chief Whip who knows the 'temper of the party and the character of its members' and they normally 'encourage or warn the Prime Minister as to particular appointments'. 21 As former
Conservative Chief Whip, Martin Redmayne, once remarked 'I'm not called the patronage secretary for nothing'.
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Part of our motivation for examining these questions stems from the fact that no former Chief
Whip has risen to the leadership of either the Conservative or Labour parties before or since. 
The Traditional Variables Influencing Ministerial Selection
Before attempting to assess these three questions, however, it is necessary to consider the traditional academic explanations on how and why ministers are selected. The literature emphasises how Prime Ministers face a number of constraints that will influence who can be appointed; at what level; and in which department. The first criteria that a Prime Minister will consider relates to their suitability for political office. The dominant consideration here will be political competence. Potential ministers need to be administratively competent, and establish confidence that they have the ability to implement policy effectively within their department.
Aspiring ministers also need to have established a reputation in Parliament, and demonstrate that they have the ability to defend their department effectively during parliamentary debate. 31 The growing influence of television would increase the need for ministers to be proficient at explaining departmental policy in set piece interviews. 32 Questions of competence also relate to the suitability of parliamentarians to the demands of ministerial office. Suitability can also embrace other aspects. The Chief Whip will inform the Prime Minister of parliamentarians known for engaging in inappropriate personal conduct, such as excessive drinking or sexually inappropriate behaviour, and this can lead to a parliamentarian being discounted as a potential minister. 33 Beyond suitability the Prime Minister also needs to consider a range of balances. First, Prime Ministers need to be sensitive to regional balance, and given the limited parliamentary representative of the Conservatives from Wales, Scotland and northern England, Conservative
Prime Ministers need to think carefully before creating a ministerial team that seems to be overly dominated by south east England. 34 Although not such a central consideration for Heath as it has become for David Cameron 35 gender considerations need to be taken into account, although the literature on the Heath era refers to Thatcher as the 'token' female Cabinet minister. 36 Balance will also embrace age and experience: some parliamentarians will be discounted on the grounds of being too old, whereas new parliamentarians are not usually considered for ministerial preferment because they are seen as being too inexperienced and in many cases are too young.
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Prime Ministers also need to utilise ministerial preferment as a means of facilitating effective party management. For example, leading figures within the party who could be viewed as 'veto players', (because they possess influence and provide gravitas), need to be accommodated. 38 Upon entering government from opposition, new Prime Ministers usually incorporate into their Cabinet their principal opponents for the party leadership and those who have substantive followings within the parliamentary party and beyond. 39 Prime Ministers also need to be sensitive to the assumption that the ministerial team should be broadly representative of the strands of opinion within the parliamentary party. 40 However, while showing sensitivity to this assumption the incumbent leader will need to ensure that the faction to which s/he is associated secures sufficient ministerial preferment. This is a balancing act. With regard to how to achieve it Rose notes that whilst some Prime Ministers might 'err on the side of caution' and appoint the 'maximum level of personally loyal colleagues', this needs to be 'counterbalanced' by the appointment of some 'potentially disloyal' colleagues in order to 'gain silence'.' 41 Having considered all of the factors when forming a ministerial team, Prime Ministers then have to grapple with the necessity of reshuffles. 42 Reshuffles are required for a variety of reasons. First, to ensure the overall effectiveness of the Government it is necessary to 'remove' those identified as 'inadequate'. 43 Second, reshuffles are undertaken for the longer term development of the party. For example, they provide junior level ministerial experience opportunities for those identified as talented so that in a decade or two the future Cabinet ministers for the party have received a proper preparation for high office. This process of advancing new and talented parliamentarians, demands that fading ministers are removed. 44 Third, Prime Ministers can use reshuffles to renew their administrations and regain public confidence, which may have been undermined by perceived policy failure or scandal. 45 Finally, reshuffles can also be seen as mechanisms through which Prime Ministers can attempt to reassert their authority over their party. Dismissing ministers or moving them sideways (to less appealing portfolios), limits the capacity for senior ministers to challenge the authority of the Prime Minister. Thus reshuffles can be viewed as 'strategic devices' designed to 'fend off intraparty rivals', who may be motivated to use ministerial office and their departmental positions, to serve their own interests. This might mean promotion to a more senior and prestigious portfolio, or it might mean the party leadership itself. 46 Therefore, Prime Ministers can use reshuffles to 'undercut' the incentives for ministers to 'engage in self-interested behaviour'. 47 There is also a tradition that reshuffles should happen each year and as such they have become annual events of huge intra-party significance in British politics. 48 They are seen as the means by which the Prime Minister uses the prospect of ministerial advancement to retain the loyalty of ambitious backbench parliamentarians. Should the Prime Minister reshuffle too infrequently, or simply use reshuffles to swap existing ministers around rather than dismiss, then rumblings of discontent and talk of 'thwarted ambition' on the backbenchers will intensify.
49
Therefore, although Prime Ministerial powers of appointment might appear to be about 'command' and 'obedience', they are actually characterised by 'bargaining' given the constraints 
The 'Lubrication' of Ministerial Reshuffles
Ball has argued that Heath is open to criticism for the infrequency of his reshuffles -is this a valid critique? 51 Heath entered power with a determination to be the antithesis of Wilson, who 'shoved people around as part of a political game'. 52 Heath felt that reshuffles should not be driven by narrow party calculation. He subscribed to the view that constant ministerial tinkering prevented ministers from 'developing the expertise and acumen needed to control a complex modern bureaucracy' and thus 'reshuffles destroy the informational gains that prolonged ministerial tenure can bring'.
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Heath's instincts were towards 'professionalism', and thus between 1965 and 1970 he appointed shadow spokesmen 'who had specialised in their subjects', and then he wanted 'continuity between opposition and government', and limits to the 'restless game of musical chairs'.
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This emphasis on demonstrating 'knowledge' and 'specialism', combined with his intentions towards longevity within departments would enable ministers to see policy through and overcome Civil Service dominance. 55 Numerically, despite his intentions Heath would reshuffle at a rate not that dissimilar to his predecessors. 56 However, there are explanations for some of the ministerial changes that 
'Reward or Punishment': How Important was Loyalty to Appointments and

Dismissals?
In his excellent examination of backbench rebellion in the Heath era, Philip Norton noted the view of a Conservative parliamentarian who failed to secure ministerial preferment under Heath (but was later a minister in the Thatcher era), who 'felt a certain resentment at seeing men, whom he considered to be less able then himself, being given ministerial office'
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). Two related perceptions became established: a). that loyalty rather than ability was the dominant concern with Heath 65 , and b). that the ministerial ranks were not ideologically representative of the PCP 66 (thus, the right appear to assume that their faction was awash with competent candidates for ministerial office: our concern here is their perception not the reality Roth offers a critical appraisal. He noted that the Heathmen 'seemed chosen favourites rather than obvious choices', and that their promotions indicated that Heath was keen to surround himself with those whose positions 'depended more on loyalty to him than to proven ability'. 73 That Heath had used the opposition era, and the transition to government, to advance younger and inexperienced Conservatives aroused 'dissatisfaction among more seasoned representatives who thought that they had been overlooked'.
74
As a consequence the 'Heathmen'
became seen 'as a specific faction within the party'. This accusation was compounded by the perception that Heath himself 'habitually treated Conservatives outside the new magic circle in a dismissive fashion'.
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The most obvious senior Conservative who was overlooked was Enoch Powell. His supporters argued that his exclusion was because Heath feared being outshone by Powell. 76 Despite not being a member of the shadow Cabinet, (Heath having dismissed him in 1968 in the aftermath of his notorious 'Rivers of Blood' speech), Powell was a dominant personality in the lead up to the 1970 General Election and the campaign itself. Indeed, the press association assigned two reporters to him as opposed to one for Heath, Wilson and Jeremy Thorpe, thus creating an impression that it was a virtual four party campaign, as Powell (or reaction to Powell) took up about 20 percent of all election coverage on television. 77 Powell would later claim that his interventions on immigration contributed to the election victory, but whether he wanted the Conservatives to win was another question. 78 Powell admitted that victory 'sealed my exile' 1966, but all were keen to serve post 1970. 81 For example, when they entered power Sandys expected ministerial office. After overlooking him Whitelaw warned Heath that 'as the months go by he will probably become increasingly more difficult'. 82 However, it was the exclusion of the former party chair, Edward du Cann, which had longer term implications. du Cann was also identifiable with the right, even though he had backed Maudling in the 1965 leadership election.
It was known that Heath and du Cann disliked each other. 83 However, when Heath removed him from the chairmanship of the Party in 1967, du Cann was left with the impression that he would be offered a Cabinet post when they returned to power. When bypassed for ministerial office he felt that he was being 'made to pay the price for [an] ancient quarrel' over the Common Market. 84 Yet, du Cann was not the first on the right to incur the wrath of Heath during opposition.
Shortly after he acquired the party leadership in July 1965, Angus Maude (at that time Conservative spokesman on Colonial Affairs) wrote in the Spectator that the Conservatives needed to stop 'pussy footing on the trade unions'; that they should 'condemn high taxation' and they should 'specify radical changes in the welfare state'. 85 Maude was sacked by Heath. To some (i.e. the right) the treatment of Maude and du Cann suggested that Heath was a man who nursed grudges. 86 King felt that the consequence of this was that Heath had a 'weak Cabinet' because he liked to be 'surrounded by his friends rather than the most able members of the party'. 87 The other excluded bloc was those with known anti-EEC sentiments. This 'undermined morale within the parliamentary party' and left Heath without 'any means of communication between the pro and anti marketeers', leaving them feeling 'dispossessed'. 88 Piper has noted that Heath's 'personality led him to systematically exclude dissidents' and led to a 'punitive' and 'intolerant' mentality towards dissent. 89 Within each letter Pym highlights the age of each minister (and selected backbenchers) and ends with a summary of recommendations under headings, including 'to be considered (pre-1970)'; 'to be considered (1970 intake); 'to be promoted'; and 'for retirement'. The use of the term 'retirement' only partly reflected a desire to remove older ministers and replenish the ministerial stock with younger and fresher faces. At Cabinet level, Davies and Campbell, as they were both in their fifties should be 'retired', and that advice was not taken. Nonetheless, the sense that the right was insufficiently represented at ministerial level would remain (In part this was not helped by some of their own -Jasper More resigned from the Whips' Office, and Teddy Taylor from the Scottish Office, in opposition to the passage of the European Communities Act). 110 The perception that Heath was not running a balanced administration was not aided by the fact that when he did circulate ministerial office, the youngsters being advanced seemed to be those identifiable with the moderate wing of the party - He has warned me he is a possible abstainer on the 28 th , but of course if you decided to bring him back and invited him in time, and he accepted it, he would be an extra vote...it would strengthen your government to bring him back and would be well received in the party. 114 However, the advice on du Cann was ignored, and the same would apply when Pym suggested that Maude should be 'considered for inclusion'
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. To replace the soon to be dismissed Ridley, Heath's responses to these recommendations is evident from his action (or inaction) rather than from documentary evidence.
Analysis and Conclusion
This paper has examined three key issues with regard to how Heath utilised his powers of Those who were appointed into ministerial office tended to have strong disciplinary records within a party whose rebellions rates were intensifying under Heath's leadership. Moderate loyalists tended to be candidates for ministerial office, and critics of Heath tended to be located on the right. This did not appear to concern Heath as much as it appeared to concern Pym as Chief Whip. There was a clear perception among those on the right that prior rebellions (be that over Rhodesian sanctions, immigration or the EEC), were held against them and impeded their future ministerial prospects. 133 However, once they felt that 'no one who had ever voted against the Government received promotion', so they came to think that they 'had nothing to lose by doing so again'. Whilst valid this explanation maps onto a frontbench and backbench distinction. The Thatcher campaign had strong links to the backbench powerbase that du Cann had cultivated. 151 Those whom Heath had appointed to ministerial office tended to back him, and those denied office formed the core of the Thatcher voting bloc. 152 Heath's own career was forged through being Chief Whip and the importance attached to this role by both Eden and Macmillan. As Chief Whip in the 1950s Heath had been aware of the need to introduce 'new blood'
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, but this awareness abandoned him in office. His refusal to utilise the 'political arts he practiced in Macmillan's service' created the tragic irony that a vaunted former Chief Whip failed to understand or appreciate that he was losing the support of his own party 154 . His failure to utilise his powers of patronage -and counterbalance loyalists with critics -flowed from his failure to act upon the advice provided to him by Pym. Had Heath listened to Pym in the way that Macmillan had listened to him then the mobilisation of critics that would unseat him could have been stalled 155 . The removal of Heath represents a critical juncture in Conservative politics, and Heath's weak grasp of how to use patronage as a method of effective party management was a contributing factor.
